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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY, a ~Iunicipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CLYDE C. P~\TTERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant sought by way of declaratory judgmen1 
in the lower court (1) that court's determination that 
under Chapter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, now commonly 
referred to as Section 104-4-2, Utah Code· Annotated, 
1943, as amended, Ogden City qualifies for but one city 
judge, and (2) that if it be determined that under such 
section Ogden qualifies for two city judges, still the 
respondent Patterson is not lawfully a city judge of 
Ogden City. 
The chronology of events leading up to the present 
litigation are as follows: 
On ~larch 8, 19·51, the Legislature enacted what is 
now known as Chapter 26, La.ws of Utah, 1951, and 
which we hereinafter refer to· as Sections 104-4-2, 104-
4-3, 104-4-3.10, 104-4-3.11, and 104-4-3.12, U.C.A. 1943, 
as amended. These enactments became effective May 
8, 1951. So far as here pertinent they read as follows: 
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"104--4-2. Judges-Election of-Number of 
Judges-Term and Tenure of Office. 
At the municipal election to be held in the 
year 1951 'j and sexennially thereafter, city judges 
shall be elected by the qualified electors of their 
respective cities in the manner provided by this 
act. In cities having a population, as determined 
by the next official census and each official cen-
sus thereafter of 50,000 and less than 100,000 
there shall be two city judges ; * * *. '' 
'' 104-4-3. Id. Appointment by Mayor Pend-
ing Election. 
Whene·ver it shall appear hy official census 
that any city has attained sufficient population 
to place it within the class of cities having city 
courts, or to raise it to a class entitled to have 
an additional judge or judges, the mayor of such 
city, with the consent of the governing body 
thereof, shall appoint a city judge or judges who 
shall be entitled to serve until twelve o'clock 
noon on the first Monday of January succeeding 
the next municipal election after said appoint-
ment or appointments a.re made, at which city 
judges are elected, and until their successors are 
ele-cted and qualified.'' 
'' 104-4-3.10. Declaration of Candidacy. 
• * * 
(a) * * *. 
(h) ~ * *. 
(c) * * *. If only one candidate files for any 
specific office, such person shall forthWith be 
issued a certificate of election by the city re-
corder. * * *. '' 
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On July 31, 1951, and within the time allowed by law 
therefor, Patterson filed his declaration of candidacy, 
supported by the required petition of one hundred vot-
ers, for the office of Judge of the Second Division of 
the Ogden City Court (the office held by the then in-
cumbent city judge being designated by the City Re-
corder as Judge of the First Division). No other can-
didates filing for Judge of the Second Division within 
the time allowed by la,v, the City Recorder, on August 
7, 1952, issued to ~Ir. Patterson a certificate of election 
to this office as provided by Section 104-4-3.10, supra, 
and duly advised the governing body of Ogden City that 
she had done so. (E,xhibit 1). 
On November 6, 1951, Ogden City held its regular 
municipal election, and it did not submit to the voters 
the office of Judge of the Second Division of the Ci~y 
Court. 
On December 4, 1951, as an ''economy measure'' 
the ·Ogden City Counsel decide·d to refuse to create the 
job if that was legally possible. 
On December 27, 1951, the emoluments of the office 
of Judge of the Second Division were included by Ogden 
City in its budget, and the City Manager was "author-
ized" to take whatever steps were necessary to deter-
mine ''the legality of this case'' by declaratory action. 
(Exhibit A). 
On December 31, 1951, Ogden City adopted its bud-
get, which included the salary for the second judge. On 
the same day its City Recorder received for filing and 
filed Patterson's oaJth a.s judge of such second division. 
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On January 5, 1952, Mr. Thatcher, as attorney for 
Ogden City, filed a complaint herein, by which not 
only the question of the existence of the office was raised, 
but the second question-purely gratuitous as we view 
it-of Patterson's right to hold the office, assuming it 
does exist. Respondent will develop its views under 
four points of argument, as follows: 
POINT I: 
THE OFFICE FOR WHICH P ATTERSQN 
HOLDS A CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION AND 
FOR WHICH HE QUALIFIED BY TAKING THE 
REQUIRED OATH OF OFFICE· DOES EXIST. 
(A) BECAUSE IT WAS CREATED BY THE 
PROVISION OF SECTION 104-4-2, and 
(B) REGARDLE1SS OF THE INTERPRETA-
TION TO BE GIVEN SECTION 104-4-2 THE 
OFFICE HERE IN QUESTION CAME INTO 
BEING BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 104-4-3. 
POINT II: 
APPELLANT OGDEN CITY IS WITHOUT 
RIGHT TO RAISE~ THE QUESTION OF RE-
S:PONDENT'S RIGHT TO HOLD THE OFFICE 
BECAUSE 
(A) RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO THE OFFICE 
CAN BE RAISED ONLY BY THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL ON BEHALF OF THE 
STATE, OR BY ANOTHER CLAIMANT TO 
THE OFFICE; and 
(B) OGDEN CITY CANNOT ATTACK THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW 
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PO I~:rr III : 
SECT!()~ 104-4:-3.10 IS NOT UNCONSTITU-
TION _A_L IN ITS PROVISIONS FOR THE ISSU-
_._-\.NCE OF _._\ CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION TO 
AN l-.-KCOXTESTED CANDIDATE. 
POINT IV: 




THE OFFICE FOR WHICH PATTERSON HOLDS 
A CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION AND FOR WHICH 
HE QUALIFIED BY TAKING THE REQUIRED 
OATH OF OFFICE DOES EXIST (A) BECAUSE 
IT WAS CREATED BY THE PROVISION OF SEC-
TION 104-4-2, AND (B) REGARDLESS OF THE IN-
TERPRETATION TO BE GIVEN SE·CTION 104-4-2 
THE OFFICE HERE IN QUESTION CAME· INTO 
BEING BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 104-4-3. 
(A) THE OF~,ICE WAS CREATED BY VIRTUE OF 
SECTION 104-4-2. 
Appellant Ogden City's position with respect to 
this phase of the matter is summed up concisely by the 
allegation of its complaint (Par. 13) (a) that the office 
in question will not come into heing 
''Until it shall be determined by the official cen-
sus next hereafter ensuing'' 
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that Ogden has a population of fifty thousand. On the 
contrary, respondent's position is that the office was 
in existence on July 31, 1951, when he filed his declara-
tion of candidacy therefor, and has been ever since. 
This point of argument does not concern itself with 
the question of whom, if anyone, holds the office, but 
with the sole question of whether the office exists. The 
answer lies with the interpretation to he given to Chap-
ter 26, Laws of Utah, 19·51, enacted March 8, 1951, 
effective May 8, 1951, and particularly the t.wo sections 
thereof known as 104-4-2 and 104-4-3, supra. Both of 
these sections of the statute are self-executing. As and 
when the conditions required by either exist the office 
as such comes into being without anything further re-
quired. We accordingly examine the provisions thereof 
in the light of the known £acts to the end of dete-rmining 
if either have become operative insofar as Ogden City 
is concerned. 
'The pertinent language, insofar as Section 104-4-2 
is ~orrcerned, is : 
''In cities having a population, as d·ete-rmined 
by the next official census and each official cen-
sus thereafter of 50,000 and less than 100,000, 
there shall be two city judges.'' 
Ogden City contends that the key words "next 
official census'' mean the number of people listed on 
the census enumeration sheets officially taken next 
after the effective date of the act. Respondent con-
tends that it means the official announcement of the 
. 6 
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correct enumeration, \Yhic.h announcement occurs next 
after the effectiYe date of the act, and as the official 
announcement of the 1950 count 'Yas not made until 
subsequent to the effectiYe date of the act, that an-
nouncement here controls. 
What is a census·? Is it the actual count, as claimed 
by appellant~? Or is it the official announcement as 
to the results of that count after duplications, omissions, 
mistakes and other errors have been eliminated~ 
.J._~uthorities probably are not in complete agree-
ment upon the subject, but a careful reading and analysis 
of each case actually results in fairly complete reconcile-
ment. A general legal definition of the meaning of the 
word "census" is found in 14 C .J.S. (Census) Section 1, 
Page 101: 
''In general, a census must he an official 
enumeration of the people, and, as such, a public 
record, containing not merely a sum total, hut 
an official list, of the names of all the inhabitants 
preserved in the public archives. . . '' . 
And in 14 C.J.S (Census) Section 6, Page 103: 
"In the absence of a statute requiring any 
formal action by the census board or the legis-
lature, a census goes in to legal effect, as such, 
on its compilation and publication by the census 
superintendent or hoard. It is generally held 
that a census, after it has been officially deter-
mined or ascertained and published does not re-
late back and give the fact force as of the date 
of which the census was to be taken; but it has 
also been held that a census, being the enumer-
ation of the population and not the announcement 
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of the result, becomes effective as of the date 
taken. An authorized announcement of a federal 
census 1 s official, even though not final, and ex-
pressly subject to correc~tion. '' 
Cases supporting this general statement of the law 
include the following: 
Lewis v. Lackawanna County (Pa) 50 A.. 162 
(1901) 
The second syllabus reads: 
''Under a.ct March 31, 1876, providing for 
salaries of county officers in counties with more 
than 150,000 inhabitants, county offiees do not 
become salaried offices immediately on the county 
attaining sueh population, but only when such 
fact is legally ascertained by the census bureau 
making returns of the population to congress, or 
making final report; and such aseertainment does 
not relate back, and give the fact force as of the 
date of which the census was to be taken.'' 
(Italics added) 
And from the opinion: 
''It is of general knowledge that the results 
of the census have not been promptly reached; 
that of 1880 not having been officially announced 
until 1883, and that of 1890 not until 1895. On 
the argument of appellee everything dependent 
on the census would be kept in a state of suspen-
sion, or in danger of being turned topsy-turvy, 
for an indefinite period. The only escape from 
such intolerable inconven.ience and confusion is 
by adherence to the. logical principles of the law 
that. the fact becomes applicable only from its 
legal ascertainment." (Italics added). 
8 
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lrolfe v. (1 ify of Jloorhead (Jli'ull.) 107 N. W. 
728 (1906) 
The third syllabus reads: 
··OENSUS-TIL\iE OF TAKING EFFECT: 
The fifth decennial census of Minnesota went 
into legal effect upon its compilation and publi-
cation by the superintendent of the census, and 
not upon the deposit of the enumeration in his 
hands.'' 
... c\_nd from the opinion : 
··The plaintiff argues that, inasmuch as the 
enumeration was required to be completed on or 
before the 1st day of July, and to be pla.ced in 
the hands of the superintendent of the census not 
later than the lOth of July, therefore the election 
held in October was governed by statutes appli-
cable to cities of more than 4,000 inhabitants. 
That enumeration did not constitute the census 
in law; on the contrary, it was but a step in its 
creation. The census went into legal effect upon 
its compilation and publication by the superin-
tendent. Section 18. Until that time, the various 
municipal corporations of the state \Vere governed 
by the laws applicable to cities of the class de-
termined by the previous census. '' 
Broyles v. Mahaska County (Ia.) 239 N. W. 
1 (1931) 
In this case, as in the preceding one, the statute 
directed publication of the figures, which is what the 
federa.l law requires. 
The first syllabus reads: 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'' Sinc.e publication of census is to be under 
se-cretary of state's certificate,, date of certificate 
determines when census becomes effective.'' 
The second syllabus reads: 
''Where secretary of state did not certify 
1925 census of Iowa until February 1, 1926, cen-
sus did not become effective until such date.'' 
And from the opinion : 
''It is apparent from these provisions of the 
Code that it was the intent of the Legislature to 
fix a time when said census report should become 
effective. Such things are matters whic.h courts 
eannot determine, as they vary from time to time 
with the change in population, and it was the 
evident inte-nt of the Legislature, as shown by 
the requirements in these sections, that the pub-
lication of this c.ensus was to he under the cer-
tificate of the sec.retary of state, which must be 
dated, and it must therefore follow that the date 
of the eertifica.te is the day on which the census 
becomes effective. 
''As applied to this case, the evidence shows 
this c.ertifica.te was dated February 1, 1926. It 
must be held, therefore, that the new 1925 census 
was not effective until the last-named date-, and 
prior to tha.t the city of Oskaloosa had, in law, 
a population of less than 10,000. This is in line 
with the holdings in other states. As throwing 
light on this question, see State v. Smith, 149 
Wash. 173, 270 P. 306; Holcomb v. Spikes (Tex. 
Civ. App.) 282 S. W. 891; Wolfe v. City of Moore-
head, 98 Minn. 113, 197 N. W. 72'8; State v. 
Brooks, 58 Wash. 648, 109 P. 211. '' 
Also we refer to the following: 
10 
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Holcomb v. 8pike (llex.) 232 f3. W. 891: 
• 'A census must he an official enumeration 
of the people, and as such a public record con-
taining not merely a sum total, but an official 
list of the names of all inhabitants . . " 
State v. Wooten ( JJ o.) 122 S. W. 1101 : 
'• A census of a city is an official enumera-
tion of the inhabitants with details of sex, age 
and family. It is a public document to be pre-
served jn the archives of the city, rather than 
a mere sum total of the inhabitants.'' 
City of Hungington v. Cast (Ind.) 48 N. W. 
10±5: 
''A c.ensus is not merely a sum total, but an 
official list containing the names of all the in-
habitants.'' 
The above three cases and the excerpts therefrom 
are cited and quoted by appellant as support for its 
position that it is the actual count that is important, 
but the language imports the contrary. They say that 
the census is the ''official list'' which o hviously is not 
the tally of the enumerators, but rather a document pre-
pared therefrom and reflecting the correction of all 
errors and mistakes made by the enumerators. 
Applying this to our own situation. There is a 
discrepancy of 204 between the first preliminary an-
nouncement of 56,908 (R. 030-031) and the final listing 
of 57,112 (R. 014, Exhibit B). Obviously, the official 
census is the final c.orrected list of 57,112 as announced 
by the Director on June 17, 1951, and not the actual 
count made by the enumerators during April, 1950, which 
11 
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patently was erroneous, or the equally erroneous pre-
liminary announcement of 56,908 made on June 14, 1950, 
or of 56,910 made on August 25, 1950. 
Further reference should perhaps he here made to 
the case of Lewis v. Lackawanna, supra., and quoted 
from by appellant at. page 11 of its brief as follows: 
"The census is the enumeration of the popu-
lation, not the announcement of the results.'' 
We have carefully examined this case as it appears 
in 50 Atlantic 162, and find no such statement as that 
therein. On the contrary the case holds that it is the 
final report of the census bureau which controls, and 
which report does not relate back to the date of actual 
taking. 
We do come, however, to a group of cases holding 
that preliminary announcements have their place in 
the overall scheme, and may be used as "guideposts" 
for official action. Cases of this type are 
State v. Ryan (Mo.) 133 S. W. 8 (1910) 
Ervine v. Sta.te (Tex.) 44 S. W. (2) 380 (19·31) 
Herdon v. Garfield County (Okla.) 295 P. 223 (1931) 
Childers v. Dew,all, 62 S. W. 802 (Ark.) 
Elliot v. Sta,te (Okla.) 1 P. 2d 370 (1931) 
Gross v. Ross (Ky.) 185 8. W. 2d 547 (1945) 
Washita County v. Lowden (Okla.) 116 P. 2d 700 
(1941) 
Forde v. Owens (S. C.) 158 S. E. 157 (1931) 
. 12 
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r_rhese case~ are all to the effect that the preliminary 
report may be used as a guide in determining a status. 
In other words, the preliminary report may be relied 
upon until the final report is made. 
Examples of thi~ type of case are : 
E-rl'iu r. State (Tex) 1931. Page 1 of the syllabus 
states: 
''Preliminary a1mouncement of census show-
ing· eity over 20,000 should have been guide of 
officials concerning mode of drawing jury (Ver-
non's Ann. Civ. St. art. 2094; 13 U.S.C.A. Sec-
tios ±, 205, 213, and 210 et seq.)." 
Washita County v. Lowden (Okla.) 1941. 
''1. CENSUS 
In determining classification into which 
county should be placed for county officers' 
salary purpose, a census bulletin officially 
issued~ though a preliminary report, was a guide 
for official action with respect to population." 
These cases are of little actual value in the de-
termination of what is a census, because that question 
was not there involved. The inference to be gathered 
therefrom, however, is that if the preliminary announce-
ments are but guideposts, they are guideposts to the 
census, whic.h of necessity must be the final official 
announcement. 
There are a group of cases, however, which may 
appear at first blush to support appellant's position 
that the effective date of the census was the date as of 
which it was taken, rather than the subsequent official 
announcement. These cases are 
13 
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Underwood v. Hickman (Tenn) 39 S. W. 2d 1034 
Twin Falls v. Koehler (Ida) 123 P. 2d 715 
Jordan v. DeHart (Wash.) 131 P. 2d 156. 
However, in each of these cases the question involved 
was the time of the fact itself, rather than the time of 
determination of the fact. In other words, if the words 
''as determined'' were eliminated from the phrase ''as 
determined by the next official census'' appearing in 
our statute, the cases would be more in point. In the 
recent case of Varble v. Whitecotton (Mo) 190 S. W. 2d 
244 (1945) the Supreme Court of Missouri analyzed and 
distinguished these three cases. This Missouri court 
said: 
'' ( 3, 4) There is no statutory provision, either 
Federal or State, which sets the time when the 
results of a census shall become official. In such 
a situation the general rule is that a census be-
comes official as of the date of its official publi-
cation. 14 C.J.S., Census, Section 6. This court 
has always taken judicial notice of ''the official 
records of the eensus'' and we find no case where 
the fact of population has been proved by other 
means. State ex rel. Harris v. Herrman, 75 Mo. 
340; State ex rei. Martin v. Wofford, 131 Mo. 61, 
25 S. W~ 851; State ex inf. Crow v. Evans, 166 
Mo. 34 7, 66 S. W. 355. In State ex rei, Major v. 
Ryan, 232 Mo. 77, 133 S. W. 8, a quo warranto to 
remove the jury commissioners of St. Joseph be-
cause the population fell below the applicable 
limit, the natio.nal census of 1910 'as officially 
promulgated'' was the basis of the decision. And 
in Jerabek v. City of St. Joseph, 159 Mo. App. 
505, 141 S. W. 456, which considered a motion to 
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quash a panel selected by the abovP jury coin-
missioners, the court of appeals in sustaining the 
motion pointed out the jury had been selected 
after "·the federal census of 1910 was officially 
announced.'' To the same effect was Childers v. 
Duvall, 69 .. A.rk. 336, 63 S. W. 802; Holcomb v. 
Spikes, Tex. <._'1iv. App. 232 S. W. 891; Lewis v. 
Laeka"~anna County, 17 Pa. Super. 25; Id., 200 
Pa. 590. 50 A. 162. There are contrary rulings 
mainly in cases "rhere the fact of population 
rather than its determination by the census con-
trols. 8ee Underwood v. Hickman, 162 Tenn. 689, 
39 S. \v.... 2d 1034 ~ State ex rei. Jordan v. Hart, 
15 \\'"ash. 2d 551, 131 P. 2d 156; City of Twin 
Falls ex rel. Cannon v. Koehler, 63 Idaho 562, 
123 P. 2d ·715; Forde v. Owens, 160 S. C. 168, 
158 S. E. 147. 
·' ( 3) The application of the statute we are 
considering is governed by the official records of 
the census. The statute itself denotes this. Ac-
cording to its terms the mere fact of the popu-
lation in and of itself does not determine the 
statute's relevancy. The determining factor is 
something more. It is the population as enum-
erated ''according to the last preceding national 
census.'' Thus the operation of the statute is 
based on the record of the census. The record of 
the census furnishes the evidence under which 
the statute shall be operative. Dunne v. l(ansas 
City Cable R. Co., 131 Mo. 1, 32 S. W. 641. This 
appears to us to be an added reason why the 
application of the statute to Jackson County 
could not change at least until the official record 
of the ''last preceding census'' was promulgated 
disclosing Jackson County had a population 
which was without the limits set by the statute.'' 
15 
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We cannot close our discussion of the authorities 
dealing with the question of what is the effective date 
of a census without comment upon the case of State 
ex rel Brunjes v. Brockleman (M o) 240 8. W. 209, which 
appellant holds up to this court as being ''the only case 
directly in point". (Page 17 of appellant's brief). 
In that case the statute, effective as of January 1, 
1921, spoke of the ''next decennial census of the United 
States", and the court held that it could not refer to 
the 1920 census, which was then complete, but must of 
necessity refer to a subsequent one. This begs the 
question so far as "'re are concerned, because in our case 
the census was not completed until the enumeration was 
corrected, which was subsequent to the effective date 
of our act. 
Further than that, we have the· case of Varble v. 
Whitecotton, sup·~a, decided by this. same Mlisspuri 
eourt some twenty-three years later, specifically holding 
that it is the official record of the census which governs 
the application of the statute. 
We submit, aecordingly, that under the law the 
legislature, in speaking of the ''next official census'', 
spoke of the official announcement yet to be made of 
the results of the 1950 count. Otherwise we have a situ-
ation where it must be said that the Legislature in 1951 
was legislating for the future without regard to the 
present. An hypothesis will demonstrate the fallacy of 
eonstruing the word census to mean the count made as 
of April 1, rathe.r than the subsequent official report of 
the results of such count. Assume that through an error 
in assignments duplicate enumerators were sent into 
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one ~eetiou of the eity, and as a consequence their tally 
sheets listed 55,000, and the preliminary announcement 
so sho"~ed. Subsequent review by the census bureau 
disclosed the error, and the final official report showed 
45,000. What "yas the official census 1 Was it the false 
and faulty count of the enumerators 1 Or was it the 
accurate list &s reported officially by the Director~ 
Obviously it is the latter. 
In ~Iarch, 1951 the 1950 count had been made, some 
preliminary announcements had been given out which 
were faulty and incomplete, but the legislature was not 
advised as to \Yhat the official reports might show. 
Accordingly, "-hen the legislature spoke of the ''next 
official census,' it must have referred to the official 
reports of the 1950 count yet to be announced. 
The official announc~ment of June 17, 1951, ae-
cordingly, rendered Section 104-4-2 operative, and there 
was, accordingly, thereafter the offices of two judges 
of the Ogden Court to be filled in the manner provided 
by Section 104-4-3.10. 
(B) REGARDLESS OF THE INTERPRETATION 
TO BE GIVEN SECTION 104-4-2 THE OFFICE 
HERE IN QUESTION CAME INTO BEING BY 
VIRTUE OF SECTION 104-4-3. 
Section 104-4-3 provides as follows: 
"Whenever it shall appear by official census 
that any city has attained sufficient population 
to place it within the class of cities having city 
courts, or to raise it to a class entitled to have 
an additional judge or judges, the mayor of 
such city, with the consent of the governing body 
17 
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thereof, shall appoint a city judge or judges who 
shall be entitled to serve until twelve o'clock 
noon on the first Monday of January succeeding 
the next municipal election after said appoint-
ment or appointments are- made, at which city 
judges are elected, and until their successors are 
elected and qualified.'' 
It is to be noted that here we have an entirely dif-
ferent condition than in the preceding section, which 
spoke of ''as determined by the next official census''. 
Here the condition is ''whenever it shall appear by 
official census''. Not the next census, and not the last 
census, but amy official census. It is not denied, nor can 
it be, that as of June 25, 1951, the date of final publi-
cation of the 1950 count, an official census showed 
Ogden with a population in excess of 50,000. Thus, even 
though it be held that the provisions of the preceding 
se-ction are not operative, the provisions of the second 
are, and the office exists, and has existed since at least 
June 17, 1951. 
Appellant suggests as its answer to the plain and 
unequivocal language of Section 104-4-3 that this Sec-
tion does not become operative until after 104-4-2 be-
comes operative, 'vhich may not be until 1960. In other 
words, that the Legislature not only enacted 104-4-2 to 
become operative some nine years hence, but went to 
still further extremes and enacted 104-4-3 to become 
operative at some still later date. This to us is pure 
sophistry, and akin to the reflection cast upon our law-
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·'in the light of leg·islati ve hi~ tory it is reason-
able to suppose that the Legislature may some-
times be unreasonable.'' 
It is one thing to torture 104-4-2 into a construction 
that the Leg·islature in 1951 'Yas legislating for the 
future, and not for the present. To go to the still 
greater extreme and argue that this same Legislature 
in enacting 104-4-3, and in using the phrase ''an official 
census'', not only did not haYe in mind a present census, 
or the official announcement of the 1950 census, but had 
in mind an official census after the next official census 
("'"hich, in the normal ~vents, means 1970, for 
history sho"'"S that the federal decennial census is the 
only one that is ever taken) requires, in our judgment, 
just some such concept of legislative endeavors as is 
evidenced by the foregoing observation of legislative 
unreasonableness. 
We submit, accordingly, that from and after June 
25, 1951, the office here in question existed, 
(a) Because that is the date of the ''next official 
census'' referred to in Section 104-4-2, and which ren-
dered Section 104-4-2 operative; and, 
(b) Regardless of when the so-called 1950 census 
became effective, certainly from and after June 25, 1951, 
an "official census" showed Ogden with a population 
in excess of 50,000. This is all that was required to 
make Section 104-4-3 operative, and bring the office 
into existence. 
Appellant's contention that the office did not exist 
' either at the time of trial or theretofore, and does not 
now exist, cannot be sustained. 
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POINT II. 
APPELLANT OGDEN CITY IS WITHOUT 
RIGHT TO RAISE rrHE QUESTION OF RE-
SPONDE;NT'S RIGHT TO HOLD THE OFFICE 
BECAUSE (A) RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO 
THE OFFICE CAN BE RAISED ONLY BY THE 
ATTORNE.Y GENERAL ON BEHALF OF THE 
STATE, OR BY ANOTHER CLAI11ANT TO THE 
OFFICE; AND (B) OGDEN CITY CANNOT AT-
TACK THE CONSTITUTIONAI_jiTY OF THE 
LAW WHICH VESTED RESPONDENT WITH 
THE OFFICE. 
Appellant's second point of argument is that even 
if the office does exist the respondent has no right 
thereto. Respondent's answer is two-fold; first, that 
this is a question which cannot be raised by appellant; 
and second, it is without merit. The second answer will 
be c.onsidered under point III of this brief. 
(A) RESPONDE;NT'S RIGHT TO THE OFFICE 
CAN· BE RAISED ONLY BY THE ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL ON BEHALF OF THE 
STATE., OR BY ANOTHER CLAIMANT TO 
THE OFFICE. 
Appellant here seeks by Declaratory Judgment to 
have determined a question which is quo warranto in 
character. While the extraordinary writ of quo war-
ranto as such has been abolished by Rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, nevertheless the courts are 
given the power to grant appropriate relief where a 
question as to the right to hold public office arises. A 
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cn~ual reading of the rule diseloses, however, that suc.p 
remedy is not open to appellant. Rule 65B (h), (c) 
and (d), so far as pertinent, provides: 
4
' (b) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief 
may be granted: 
(1) Where any person usurps, intrudes into, 
or unlawfully holds or exercises a public 
office, * • •.; ~ 
''(c) Action by Attorney General Under Sub-
division (b) ( 1) of this Rule. 
The Attorney General may and when 
directed so to do by the Governor shall 
commence any action authorized by the 
provisions of subdivision (h) ( 1) of this 
rule. Such action shall he brought in the 
name of the State of Utah.'' 
·~(d) Action by Private Person Under Subdivis-
ion (b) ( 1) of this Rule. 
A person desiring to he entitled to a 
public or private office unlawfully held 
and exercised by another may bring an 
action therefor. * * *. '' 
Thus, it is apparent that under this rule only the 
attorney general, in the name of the state, or an in-
dividual himself claiming the office, can challenge re-
spondent's right to the office. Ogden City does not 
so qualify and neither the attorney general, nor any 
individual, has sought to invoke the remedy. As a matter 
of fact, and indicative of the position of the attorney 
general's office. is the fact that he appeared in this 
action and in the name of the State of Utah moved to 
dismiss appellant's complaint. 
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However, it may be suggested that the remedy under 
Rule 65B is but an alternative remedy, and respond-
ent's right to hold the office may nevertheless be 
ehallenged by the City in a complaint for declaratory 
judgment, despite the fact that no one else lays claim 
thereto. The answer to that is that neither the lang-
uage nor the purpose of the act lends itself to such 
construction. If the office exists, and we are here as-
suming that it does, it should be filled. To the end of 
filling it Ogden City has issued its certificate of election 
to respondent, and has accepted and filed his oath of 
office. No dispute exists as between Ogden City and 
respondent as to who is entitled to hold the office, if 
it exists. The· certificate of election issued by Ogden 
City evidences complete agreement het,veen the parties 
to this action as to who holds the office. If more than 
one person was claiming the office, and Ogden City 
thus found itself in the middle of the controversy, or 
if, as in the case of Lockler v. West Palm Beach (Fla) 
51 So. 2d 291, the city had a vacancy to fill by appoint-
ment, and was uncertain as to which of two men the 
law contemplated should receive the appointment, we 
could conceive of relief by way of declaratory judgment 
being proper. But when, as here, there is but one 
claimant to the office, and he is admittedly qualified, 
has acquired the office in the manner provided by .law, 
and taken the required oath, absent a claim by someone 
else thereto there is no controversy to be determined 
by way of declaratory judgment, or at all. And that a 
justiciable controversy is essential to the entertaining 
of an action for declaratory relief is well settled. 
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(B) t)GDJ£X t~lrl1 Y C~~NNtYP --:-\.rrrrACK THE 
t~o~srriTUTIONALITY OF ~rHE LAW 
\·rHICH \:rESTED RESPONDENT WITH 
THE OFFIL~E. 
The seeond reason ,,·hy Ogden City cannot here 
raise the question of respondent's right to this office 
(still assuming that it does exist) is because it does so 
solely upon the ground that Seetion 104-4-3.10 is un-
constitutional in its provisions for the issuance of a 
certificate of election to an uncontested candidate for 
the office. 
We say that Ogden City cannot so ehallenge the un-
constitutionality of that law for the reason that this 
court has held and reiterated that the constitutionality 
of a statute cannot be raised by one whose rights are 
not directly affected thereby. 
ll.Am. Jur. 748: 
''One of the elementary doctrines of con-
stitutional la''T' firmly established by the author-
ities, is that the constitutionality of a legislative 
act is open to attack only by a person whose rights 
are affected thereby. Before a law can be as-
sailed by any person on the ground that it is 
unconstitutional, he must show that he has an 
interest in the question in that the enforcement 
of the law would be an infringement on his rights. 
Assailants must therefore show the applicability 
of the statute and that they are thereby in-
juriously affected. The burden of proof is upon 
those who claim themselves harmed by a statute 
to show how, as to them, the statute is uncon-
stitutional. Thus, one who invokes the power 
of the court to declare an act of Congress to be 
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unconstitutional must be able to show not only 
that the statute is invalid, but that he has sus-
tained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, 
some direct injury as the result of its enforce-
ment, and not merely that he suffers in some 
indefinite way in common with people gen-
erally.'' 
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 98 P. 2d 414. 
State ex rel, Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 
P. 2d 408. 
Utah Mfgrs. Assn. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P. 
2d 229. 
The statute provides (Section 104-4-3.10) in effect 
that if but one candidate files for the office of city 
judge he should forthwith he issued a certificate of 
election for the ensuing term. With regard thereto ap-
pellant says : 
"It is submitted that the proVIsion of the 
law referred to is void and unconstitutional be-
cause it is contrary to the provisions of Article 
IV, Section 2 and 8 by which it is provided that 
every qualified citizen shall be entitled to vote 
by secret ballot at every election.'' 
In other words, the statute is unconstitutional be-
cause it deprives the citizens of their right to vote. But 
how, we ask, does this adversely affect the municipal 
corporation of Ogden City~ If this proviso deprives 
the citizens of Ogden City of a constitutional right to 
vote, they, or any one of them, might in appropriate 
proceedings challenge its validity. But Ogden City has 
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no right of ballot, and having uo ~ueh right it is de-
priYed of nothing, and hence is in no wise adversely 
affected. 
\V. e restate the proposition in still another way. As 
noted above, it is fundamental that for one to raise a 
constitutional question he must show that the alleged 
unconstitutional feature of the statute so operates as 
to deprive him of a constitutional right. Likewise, it is 
a prerequisite that he establish in himself the claimed 
right which ·is alleged to be infringed. 
16 C .J .S. (Constitutional La.w) Page 162. 
Thus, as a condition to raising the constitutional 
question that the statute deprives the voters of a right 
to vote for the office, Ogden City must establish that 
it has a right to vote, and that right is infringed. 
So analyzed it is apparent Ogden City cannot as a 
matter of law challenge the constitutionality of the law 
upon the ground it does. 
At least one other reason suggests itself in furthe-r 
support of respondent's position in this regard. How-
ever, as the foregoing is conclusive of the matter we 
mention it but briefly. 
One who has accepted the benfits of a statute may 
not thereafter question its constitutionality. Here 
Ogden City h~s accepted and acted upon all of the 
provisions of this statute. When no other candidate 
filed for the office it issued its certificate of election. 
When election time came it relied upon the statute and 
saved itself the added costs and expenses incident to 
placing respondent's name upon the ballot. Thence, 
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while the constitutionality is open to challenge by an 
elector, it is not open to challenge by Ogden City whoS€ 
own conduct in not putting respondent's name on the 
ballot gives rise to the only constitutional question in-
volved. 
POINT III 
SECTION 104-4-3.10 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
IN ITS PROVISIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A 
CERTIFICATE OF ELECTION TO AN UNCON-
TESTED CANDIDATE. 
Appellant's argument in substance on this phase 
of the matter is that a city judge is ex-officio a precinct 
justice of the peace, and being such he is a constitutional 
officer and must be elected by reason of Section 1 and 
8, of Article VIII, Constitution of Utah. 
For the sake of the argument let it be assumed for 
the moment that the office of precinct justice of the 
pe.ac.e is a c.onstitutional office and cannot be abolished 
by legislative enactments. It does not follow, however, 
that the judge of a city court, which is not a constitutional 
office, becomes a constitutional officer by reason of 
being vested ex-officio with the duties of a constitutional 
office. 
To the end of rationalizing this matter in the light 
of past decisions of this court, which are referred to 
willy-nilly by appellant, without regard to changing 
statutes, we revie'v the histo·ry of city court legisla-
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By ~ection ~13, RPYised ~tatute~ of Utah, 1898, 
the leg-islati,~e office of city justice of the peace was 
created. That this \Ya s purely a legislative office wa.s 
held by this court in the case of State ex rel v. H ow~ell, 
26 c;tah 53, 72 P. 187, in the following language: 
''The office of city justice of the peace is 
not among the offices created by the Constitu-
tion, and, as it is purely statutory, the Legisla-
ture, in its discretion, under the authority con-
ferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Consti-
tution, may before the expiration of the term of 
the incumbent, alter or abridge the term, or 
abolish the office entirely; or, when deemed nec-
essary to the public interest, may abolish said 
office in particular localities of the State, and 
establish other and different courts therein.'' 
At this point it is interesting to note that this office 
of city justice of the pea~e, which could be created, al-
tered or abolished by the legislature at will, had con-
current jurisdiction with the office of precinct justice 
of the peace. (Section 239, Rev. St. of Utah, 1898). 
By Section 1, Chapter 112, Laws of Utah, 1901, 
Municipal courts were created by the Legislature and 
by Section 6 and 7 of such chapter given all or the civil 
jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and criminal jur-
isdiction equal to that of city and county justices of 
the peace. 
At about the same time as the case of State ex rel 
v. Howell, supra, which held that city courts, whether 
they be city justices' courts or municipal courts, are 
purely legislative, this court decided the case of Love 
v. Liddle, 26 Utah 62, 72 P. 185, holding therein that 
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legislation affecting the jurisdiction of c.onstitutional 
justic.es' courts must apply to all such courts alike, and 
could not be limited to but some. As that case con-
cerned what .,vas strictly a justices' court under the 
constitution. it is of little value for present purpose~s. 
The next change of any significance came about in 
1919 (Chapter 34, Laws of 1919) when Section 1701, 
Com. Laws of Utah, 1917, was amended, and by virtue 
thereof 
Secti,on 1701 
''the city courts, municipal courts, the offices 
of city justiees of the peaee, and justices' courts 
in all cities where city courts are hereby created 
shall be united and shall c.onstitute the city courts 
of such cities, the judges of which shall be ex· 
officio justiees of the peace in such cities * * *. '' 
Section 1712 
"In cities where city courts are hereby 
created no justiee of the peace shall be elected or 
appointed, and the judge of the said city court 
shall be ex-officio c.ity justice of the peace and 
preeinct justice of the peace and as such shall 
perform the duties of the said offices. Said city 
judge, as ex -officio justice of the peace as pro-
vided in this title is here by made the successor 
of the justices of the pea.c.e now qualified or act-
ing in the city or precinct wheTe city courts are 
created.'' 
In the case of Leatham v. Reger, 54 Utah 491, 182 
P. 187, this court held the effect thereof was not to 
abolish the constitutional justices' court, but rather to 
continue it with but a single individual, name~ly, a so-
. called judge, discharging the duties of both the city 
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court and ju~tice~' eourt. In other words, the two 
courts, 'vhile administered by a single judg·e, remained 
distinct. 
That rity courts as surh under such statute were 
separate and distinct from justices' courts is further 
evidenced by this court's decision in the case of Rich 
v. Tndustrz.aJ Commission, 80 Utah 511, 15 P. 2d 641, in 
which this court pointed up the distinction by observing 
that con~tables were required to serve processes out of 
justices' eourts, but not out of city courts: 
''Before that amendment, as well as since, 
he was required to serve process issuing out of 
the courts of the justices of peace. Since that 
amendment, but not before, he is clothed with 
authority but not required to serve process out 
of the city court. '' 
Thus the law continued - two separate and distinct 
offices administered by a single individual - until the 
1933 revision, at which time what had formerly been 
Seeton 1701 became Section 20-4-2, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1933, and Section 1712 became Section 20-4-4. 
Section 20-4-2 provided as follows : 
''At the general election to he held in the 
year 1932, and quadrennially thereafter, 
there shall be elected by the qualified elec-
tors of their respective cities in the manner pro-
vided by the general ele-ction laws, in cities hav-
ing a population of 50,000 or more, four judges, 
and in other cities having a city court, one· judge, 
to be known as judges of the city court, for a term 
of four years beginning at 12 o'clock noon on 
the first Monday of January succeeding their 
election. ' ' 
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Thus it is to be seen that former Section 1701 was dras-
tically amended, and among other things the provisions 
of old Section 1701 for the ''uniting'' of the justices' 
courts with the city courts were deleted. The effect 
thereof was to do away completely with the justices' 
courts in cities where city courts were established, and 
continue only a city court. 
Old Section 1712 was continued in substantially its 
former state as Section 20-4-4, as follows: 
''In cities where city c.ourts are established 
no justice of the peace shall be elected or ap-
pointed, and the judge or judges of the city court 
shall be ex-officio justices of the peace for the 
precinct, and as suc.h shall perform the duties of 
such office. As such ex-officio justices of the 
peace they shall be the successors of the justices 
of the peace acting in the city where such city 
courts are est a hlished, ' ' 
The next change was in 1941, when Section 20-4-2 
was amended by changing the figure 50,000 to 75,000. 
(Chapter 25, Laws of Utah, 1941). By the 1943 revision 
Section 20-4-2 was continued as amended in 1941, that 
is, identical with the 1933 provision, supra, but with the 
figure 50,000 now reading 75,000. Section 20-4-2 was 
continued as in the 1933 revision, su.pra. No further 
significant changes occured until 1951, when by Chap-
ter 26, Laws of Utah, 1951, the amendments which gave 
rise to this litig·ation were adopted. 
To properly interpret the present status of city 
courts and justices in cities where city courts are located, 
the effect of the various statutory changes must be 
analyzed. Certainly as late as the decisions in the cases 
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of Lealhanl, v. Reger, and Rich v. ludustrial Comrnissiou, 
supra. \vhich interpreted Section 1701, Revised Statutes 
of Utah, 1917, as amended by Chapter 3-!, La\vs of 1919, 
the city court "~as separate and distinct from the just-
ices' court, albeit administered by a single individual 
as judge. 
But by ,~irtue of the 1933 revision of the Laws 
(Section 20-4-2), the statutory provisions theretofore 
existing, and \Yhich resulted in the continuance of the 
justices' court in cities where city courts existed through 
their uuificatioJt 'vith city courts, were deleted, and 
thence from there have been no justices' courts where 
city courts exist. Section 20-4-4 of the 1933 Revision, 
which \vas continued down to the enactment of the pre-
sent law in 1951, took care of that in the following lan-
guage: 
·'In cities \vhere city courts are established 
no justice of the peace shall be elected or ap-
pointed, and the judge or judges of the city court 
shall be ex-officio justices of the peace for the 
precinct, and as such shall perform the duties 
of such office. As such ex-officio justices of 
the peace they shall be the successors of the 
justices of the peace acting in the city where such 
city courts are established." 
True it is that this section in substance existed 
under old Section 1701, hut the then effect thereof was 
in the light of a city court united with the justices' court. 
Since 1933 a. city oourt is not a justices' court, nor any 
part thereof, but exists purely and simply as an inferior 
court created by the legislature and exercising juris-
diction prescribed by the legislature. 
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Sinc.e the abolition from the statutes of the pro-
visions of old Section 1701 uniting the courts, it might 
he suggested that Section 20-4-4 is unconstitutional 
in that it in effect abolishes the constitutional office 
of justice of the peace in cities where city courts exist. 
As this point is not here involved, nor the constitu-
tionality of that . section directly challenged, we make 
but the single observation that even if it has the effect 
of abolishing justiees' courts in eities where city courts 
exist it is not unconstitutional for that reason. 
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
''The Legislature shall determin.e the number 
of justices of the peace to be elected, and shall 
fix their powers, duties and compensation.'' 
Here is an express grant of power to the legislature 
to determine where justiees' courts shall and shall not 
exist. In determining that justices' courts need not 
exist where city courts have been created the legisla-
ture has acted within the constitution. 
In State v. Beckman, (Mo.) 1945 185 8. W. 2d 810, it 
was held: 
''While the offic.e of justic.e of the peace 
is a constitutional offiee, there is nothing in 
Article VI, Seetion 37, limiting the power of the 
legislature in determining how many justices 
of the peace the public good requires.'' 
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H lT~1der section 8 of article 6 of the Cons-
titution. the Legislature has the po,ver to 'pro-
Yide for the election of a sufficient number of 
justices of the peace in each county * * * 'vhose 
duties and compensation shall be prescribed by 
la"~.' l~nder this provision the Legislature has 
the po\Y€1' to determine how many justices there 
shall be in any county and what shall be their 
duties. The Legislature may determine that there 
shall be no justice of the peace in any given 
cotmty or portion thereof and it may restrict the 
constitutional jurisdiction of justices of the 
peace.'' 
Our interpretation of the statutes, accordingly, leads 
to the conclusion that at least since the 1933 Revision 
the city courts haYe been wholly separate and distinct 
entities created by the Legislature and existing by leg-
islative grace under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Cons-
titution. The legislature in creating them has likewise 
fixed their jurisdiction. In so doing the legislature has 
given them jurisdictional powers in many respects simi-
lar to that of justices of the peace, but in so doing the 
judg·es thereof have not been made justices of the peace, 
but rather independent judicial officers whose powers 
and functions are solely as the legislature has deter-
mined. 
This interpretation is not without benefit of judi-
cial support. The same conclusion was reached by the 
Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Ex parte Boalt, 
(Ore.) 260 P. 1004. 
There the constitution of Oregon provided for the 
election of justices of the peace for six year terms. The 
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legislature, however, created a municipal court for the 
city of Portland, and vested the judge thereof with the 
''jurisdiction and authority of a justice of the 
peace.'' 
and further provided for his election by the city coun-
sel for a four year term. · In answering the contention 
of the constitutional conflict the Supreme Court of 
Oregon held : 
''While it has been held that justices of the 
peace should be elected for the term of six years, 
there is nothing in the language of the constitu-
tion indicating that it was intended to apply to 
muneipal judges clothed with the powers of a 
justice of the peace.'' 
Thus it is apparent that the legislature has the power 
to erea te a city eourt and the power to fix the manner 
of how the judge thereof shall he selected - whether 
by election, or appointment, or any other manner. Thus 
it has the power to provide for the issuance of a certifi-
cate of election to an uneontested candidate for the 
offiee. 
We suhmi t, accordingly, that the office of judge 
of the city eourt is not a constitutional office, but is 
strictly a legislative office, and Section 104-4-3.10 is not 
unconstitutional in providing for the manner of selection 
of eity judges in the manner it does. 
POINT IV 
GENERAL OBSERVATION ON 
rrHE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Under this point of argument appellant seeks to 
lull the court into a sense of security and well being 
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by ob~er\·ing that thi~ court eun hold 104--!-3.10 uncon8-
titutional, and depriYe Respondent Patterson of his 
office of City Judg·e, 'Yithout disturbing the situation 
as to all of the other city judg·es 'vho hold certificates 
of election as uncontested candidates under this same 
Section 104--±-3.10. ..A .. ppellant 's premise is that each 
would thus hold over until his successor is elected and 
qualified. 
The difficulty "·ith the argument lies in the pos-
sible unsoundness of the premise that they hold over 
beyond the term for ,vhich they were elected. The his-
tory of this law becomes curiouser and curiouser. 
Old Section 1701, Revised Statutes or Utah, 1917, 
as amended by Chapter 34, Laws of Utah, 1919·, in pro-
viding for the election of city judges, fixed their term 
at four years, 
''and until their successors are elected and quali-
fied.'' 
When this section was amended by Section 20-4-2, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, this was deleted, and 
their terms fixed simply at four years. Section 20-4-2, 
U.C.A., 1943 was the same as in 1933, with no provisions 
for holding over. 
By Chapter 36, Laws of Utah, 1943, Section 20-4-2 
was amended-the principal effect thereof being to 
change the terms from four to six years-but the legis-
lature there specifically provided 
''Incumbents to hold office until successor 
is elected and qualified a.t the municip·al election 
in 1945. '' (Emphasis added) 
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Thus the law stood at the time of the enactment of 
Chapter 26, Laws of 1951, (now Section 104-4-3.10) 
under which the judges of other city courts hold cer-
tificates of election a.s uncontested candidates, the same 
as respondent Patterson. 
Now the interesting thing is that not only does the 
last law in effect prior to the, 1951 amendment not 
provide for a general carry over, but specifically limits 
carry over rights to incumbents in office at the time 
of passage in 1943, and further limits their rights to 
the time of the 1945 election. 
We appreciate there is some conflict of authority 
as to whether, absent specific statutory carry over 
rights, an officer continues in office beyond his fixed 
term and until his successor is qualified, and that this 
court, by dictum at least, has approved the principle 
that where the statute is silent the incumbent may hold 
over beyond his term and until his successor is· elected 
and qualified. As to whether during such carry over 
period he is '' defacto '' or ''de jure'' is another debatable 
question, which we won't dwell upon because our statute 
here is not silent, but specifically fixes and limits carry 
over rights to incumbents at the time the law was pas-
sed (Chapter 36, Laws of Utah, 1943), and then only 
to the 1945 elections. 
We submit, a-ccordingly, that everything is not in 
the ·clear insofar as other city judges who hold certifi- 1 ' 
cates of election as uncontested candidates are con-
cerned, and that this court cannot hold this law un-
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constitutional and thus deprive the respondent Patterson 
of his office "~ithout jeopardizing the position of every 
other city judge \Yho holds such a certificate of election. 
It is, at least, highly questionable as to whether any 
city judge who \Yas incumbent at the time of the 1951 
election has any hold over rights as such whatever. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit, according·ly, that the judgment of the 
lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSTEAD, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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